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Abstract 
 
The Central European banking industry is dominated by foreign-owned banks. During the 
recent crisis, for the first time since the transition, foreign parent companies were frequently 
in worse financial conditions than their subsidiaries. This situation created a unique 
opportunity to study new aspects of depositor discipline. In this article, we investigate 
whether depositors flexibly accommodated to the changing sources of risk. We also analyse 
the informational foundations of depositors’ decisions. Using a comprehensive data set, we 
find that the recent crisis did not change the sensitivity of deposit growth rates to accounting 
risk measures. We establish that depositors’ actions were much more strongly influenced by 
press rumours concerning parent companies than by fundamentals, and that the impact of 
rumours on deposit growth rates was highly economically significant. Additionally, we 
document that public aid announcements were interpreted by depositors primarily as a 
confirmation of a parent company’s financial distress. Our results have important policy 
implications, as depositor discipline is usually the only viable and universal source of market 
discipline for banks in emerging economies.  
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1. Introduction 
Banking systems in Central European (CE) countries are dominated by foreign-owned 
banks. As a result, during the recent financial crisis, which originated in developed 
economies, financial instability was largely imported to the CE banking industry from abroad. 
This phenomenon, which was unprecedented in the history of Central Europe since the fall of 
Communism, created a unique opportunity to study new aspects of market discipline in 
banking. More specifically, we are able to address important research questions in the 
described context: whether depositors react with flexibility to changing sources of risk; 
whether depositors base decisions on fundamentals or rumours; and whether depositors’ 
decisions are affected by the public aid received by certain foreign parent companies.   
Our study uses a large data set of the commercial banks operating in 11 CE countries 
and their parent companies during the 1994-2009 time period. This data set includes not only 
financial statements for each bank but also information regarding parent companies, mass-
media rumours, capital injections, bad loan removals, and emergency loans. The estimation of 
dynamic panel models explaining deposit growth rates allows us to reach several interesting 
conclusions. In particular, we find that the recent crisis did not change the sensitivity of 
deposit growth rates to accounting risk measures. We observe that depositors’ decisions were 
much more strongly influenced by press rumours regarding a parent company’s condition 
than by the fundamentals, and that the impact of rumours on deposit growth rates was highly 
economically significant. In addition, we document that public aid was principally interpreted 
by depositors as a confirmation of the financial distress of the parent company. More 
generally, our study supports, to an extent, the view that depositors monitor banks’ situations 
and react to changes in the economic environment.  
The article complements the existing empirical evidence on market discipline in banking 
in three ways. First, the article provides one of the most comprehensive evidence on 
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depositors’ market discipline. Second, it extends the traditional test of the existence of market 
discipline to the direct verification of whether deposit growth rates are affected by factors 
connected to a parent company. Third, in the context of developing economies, it provides a 
novel assessment of the significance of variables such as market rumours, parent company 
fundamentals, and the public aid received by parent companies for depositors’ decisions. 
Fourth, in a comprehensive manner, it reflects on the role of market discipline in insulating 
the stability of the banking system.  Despite the fact that the  evidence is derived from CE 
experience, we conjecture that the results here are relevant to other emerging economies with 
similar ownership and competitive banking structures.  
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature with 
a specific focus on market discipline in emerging markets. Section 3 presents our hypotheses 
and econometric model. Section 4 characterises the data set and other sources of information 
utilised in this study. In Section 5, we describe and discuss the empirical results. Section 6 
provides some robustness checks and Section 7 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature review 
The vast majority of existing studies on depositor discipline address this topic in the 
context of mature economies. These studies can be divided into two main categories. The first 
category includes research that explores the relationship between bank risk and either deposit 
interest rates or interest costs. Hannan and Hanweck (1988), Cargill (1989), Ellis and 
Flannery (1992), Kutner (1992), Brewer and Mondschean (1994), Hess and Feng (2007), and 
Uchida and Satake (2009) all established that deposit interest rates and interest costs were 
connected, in the expected manner, to measures of bank risk or manifestations of risk in bank 
activities. In particular, they documented that the deposit interest rates increased as the capital 
base of a bank worsened, the standard deviation of bank performance augmented, and the 
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assets’ interest rate risk rose. Additionally, they observed that banks with lower ratings and 
higher shares of speculative financial instruments in their assets were forced to pay higher 
interest rate costs. The second category of depositor discipline studies analyses the 
disciplinary effect of reduced deposit availability. Billet et al. (1998), Park and Peristiani 
(1998), Jordan (2000), Jagtiani and Lemieux (2000), Goldberg and Hudgins (2002), Maechler 
and McDill (2006), and Shimizu (2009) demonstrated that banks that were in danger of 
bankruptcy did not manage to attract uninsured deposits and that weak banks actively 
substituted insured deposits for lost uninsured liabilities. Moreover, these studies found 
evidence that signals generated by uninsured depositors pertaining to the critical financial 
condition of certain banks could occur as early as two years prior to the actual failure of these 
banks.  
Though the aforementioned research is certainly important, studies using data from 
emerging markets are more relevant to the current investigation. Hosono (2005) demonstrated 
that a solid capital base and high profitability lowered deposit interest costs paid by Korean, 
Indonesian, Malaysian, and Thai banks. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the same 
independent variables were insignificant in regression models explaining the growth of 
deposit volumes. Hadad et al. (2011) also found evidence of market discipline in Indonesia, 
where higher deposit rates were associated with higher default and liquidity risks. The 
mechanisms of depositor discipline in Latin American countries were studied by several 
authors. Barajas and Steiner (2000), in contrast to Hosono (2005), established that Columbian 
banks were disciplined by alterations in real deposit growth rates but not by interest costs. In 
addition, they noticed that banks recording low inflows of deposits improved their capital 
base and augmented their loan loss provisions in the next period. This last observation can be 
interpreted as an indication of the effectiveness of depositor discipline. Peria and Schmukler 
(2001) demonstrated that deposit volumes were negatively correlated and deposit interest cost 
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was positively correlated with accounting measures of bank risk in Argentina, Chile, and 
Mexico. Interestingly, in these countries, disciplining signals were generated by both 
uninsured and insured depositors. This phenomenon can be explained by the limited 
credibility of the safety nets in those nations. Calomiris and Powell (2001) confirmed that 
depositors monitored the risk-taking activities of private banks in Argentina during the last 
years of the 20th century.  
The evidence with regard to the effects of deposit insurance system implementation in 
emerging economies is ambiguous. Ioannidou and Penas (2010) established that the 
introduction of the explicit deposit insurance system in Bolivia diminished the market 
discipline exercised by large depositors. Prior to the introduction of this system, banks with a 
higher share of large deposits took less risk, whereas after the introduction, this effect 
vanished. In accordance with the conclusions reached by Ioannidou and Penas (2010), 
Mondschean and Opiela (1999) observed that the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance 
system weakened depositor discipline in Poland. In contrast,  Kouassi et al. (2011) found that 
market discipline was effective only in the presence of explicit deposit insurance systems and 
that banks took on higher risk after the introduction of depositor protection measures in 
Central and East European countries.  
Jackowicz (2004) showed that banks in Poland were disciplined mainly by deposit 
interest costs, a similar conclusion to the findings of Hosono (2005). Kraft and Galac (2007) 
provided evidence that banks in Croatia were able to increase deposit growth by raising 
interest rates in the period immediately preceding the 1998-1999 crisis. Additionally, they 
showed that Croatian depositors were relatively slow to link high deposit rates to increased 
portfolio risk. Önder and Özyildirim (2008) found that depositors in Turkey reacted 
negatively to bank risks even after the introduction of full coverage in 1994. Moreover, they 
documented that depositor discipline did not discourage Turkish banks from pursuing moral 
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hazard behaviours. The observation that deposit insurance systems in developing countries are 
frequently seen as not fully credible, made by Önder and Özyildrim (2008) and Peria and 
Schmukler (2001), is further confirmed by Prean and Stix (2011), who analysed survey data 
to conclude that Croatian depositors perceived the safety of their deposits to be relatively low 
during the 2007-2009 time period.  
Another distinct group of studies investigate whether crisis and crisis experience 
influence depositors’ behaviours. Opiela (2004) demonstrated that in the 18 month period 
directly preceding the 1997 crisis in Thailand, depositors monitored banks and finance 
companies more closely. Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004) established that during crisis periods in 
Argentina and Uruguay, depositors’ sensitivity to macroeconomic risks increased. At the 
same time, however, depositors’ sensitivity to bank-specific factors diminished. Kraft and 
Galac (2007) demonstrated that during the 1998-1999 crisis in Croatia, the interest-rate 
elasticity of deposits completely vanished, and the phenomenon of a flight to quality 
occurred. Oliveira et al. (2011) found that during the recent crisis, banks in Brazil were 
viewed as systemically important components of the financial system and recorded a 
substantial increase in uninsured deposits, whereas the other Brazilian banks lost uninsured 
deposits.  Using a large sample of banks from developed and emerging economies, 
Forssbaeck (2011) found that there was no proof of augmented market discipline during crisis 
periods. The majority of the reviewed studies thus concludes that during crises depositors 
exhibited rather low sensitivity to banks fundamentals.  
The existing evidence regarding medium- and long-term effects of crisis experience on 
depositor discipline is inconclusive. Peria and Schmukler (2001) showed that in Latin 
American countries, the sensitivity of deposit growth rates and deposit interest costs to bank 
risk measures was augmented in the post-crisis periods. However, Hosono et al. (2005) did 
not confirm the existence of this change, which is known as the wake-up-call effect. Instead, 
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they demonstrated that in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, the sensitivity of deposit volumes 
and interest costs to bank fundamentals actually declined after 1998.  
In summary, the existing literature confirms that market participants do monitor the risk-
taking activities of banks. In emerging economies, disciplining signals are generated by both 
insured and uninsured depositors, likely as a result of the limited credibility of safety nets. 
However, the existing literature does not answer the fundamental question of whether 
strengthened market discipline would be sufficient to maintain the stability of the banking 
system. Furthermore, the functioning of market discipline during periods of crisis is still 
relatively poorly understood. 
 
3. Hypotheses and empirical strategy 
We build an empirical strategy based upon the existing evidence and the specific 
situation in CE countries during the recent crisis. We start our analysis with a traditional test 
of depositor discipline existence. More specifically, we verify hypothesis H1. 
H1: In the CE countries, bank risk measures are negatively related to the growth of deposit 
volumes.  
The recent crisis could seriously alter the functioning of depositor discipline. On the one 
hand, increased risk may result in augmented sensitivity of deposit volume and interest costs 
to accounting risk measures. On the other hand, however, the response to the crisis in the 
form of extended or blanket guarantees (FSB 2009; FSB 2010) should considerably diminish 
the disciplining role of depositors’ actions. Based on purely theoretical grounds, it is difficult 
to forecast which of the two effects identified above is stronger. As a consequence, we test 
hypothesis H2 in the following form. 
H2: During the recent crisis, the sensitivity of deposit volume to accounting measures of bank 
risks in the CE countries was different than it was during the other periods studied. 
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From 2007 onward, the instability in the CE banking industry was mainly imported 
from developed countries. Therefore, if market discipline reacts flexibly to changing market 
conditions (as its proponents claim), the competitive position of foreign-owned banks 
controlled by financially distressed owners should be negatively affected. This line of 
reasoning produces hypothesis H3 for testing: 
H3: During the recent crisis in the CE countries, foreign-owned banks controlled by 
distressed owners had difficulties in attracting new deposits.  
The anxiety regarding the financial health of foreign-owned banks might encourage 
certain depositors to withdraw their funds and search for safer investment opportunities. In the 
CE countries, one source for such opportunities was the offers of state-owned banks. In the 
majority of cases, these banks maintained a traditional banking business model. As a result, 
these institutions were relatively unaffected by the recent crisis. This reasoning leads us to the 
formulation of hypothesis H4. 
H4: The uncertain financial conditions of foreign banks enabled state-owned banks in the CE 
countries to record higher deposit growth than other banks during the recent crisis. 
Depositors are usually unsophisticated investors. We can therefore assume that their 
investment decisions are influenced more by mass-media rumours than by bank fundamentals. 
Even the small group of sophisticated depositors is forced to take mass-media rumours into 
account because this group is aware of the simple decision-making processes applied by the 
majority of bank depositors. In the context of the recent crisis and the CE banking industry, 
these arguments permit us to formulate hypothesis H5. 
H5: During the recent crisis, depositors’ behaviour was more strongly influenced by rumours 
concerning the financial health of foreign parent companies than by the financial 
fundamentals of these foreign parent companies.  
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Many parent companies of banks operating in the CE countries received state aid during 
the recent period of crisis. On the one hand, this aid should stabilise the situation of the parent 
company and its subsidiaries. On the other hand, negative press coverage accompanying 
capital injections and other forms of public assistance may damage the reputation of a bank 
and thereby sap the confidence of its depositors. The net impact of public aid on depositors’ 
decisions is thus an open question. Hypothesis H6 assumes that the two effects offset each 
other perfectly or near perfectly.  
H6: Public aid received by parent companies does not significantly influence the deposit 
dynamics recorded by the CE banking subsidiaries. 
To test our hypotheses, we employ dynamic panel models similar to the models used by 
Maechler and McDill (2006) and Oliveira et al. (2011). We use the real growth rate of 
deposits from non-financial entities ( itGRDEPOSIT ,_ ) as the dependent variable in these 
models. Unfortunately, we are unable to differentiate in this study between insured and 
uninsured deposits. However, as we discussed in Section 2, in emerging economies, deposit 
insurance systems are not fully credible, or at least are seen by depositors as not fully 
credible. We expect that this shortcoming of our empirical strategy will bias the results 
against finding proofs of market discipline existence. The estimated models are built 
according to the general principles expressed by equation (1). 
itit
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ititititit
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OSaCVaMDaaGRDEPOSITGRDEPOSIT
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,76,5,14
,3,2,110,1,
_
__





                     (1) 
In equation (1), itGRDEPOSIT ,1_   denotes the lagged dependent variable recorded by bank i 
in period t; MD is a set of explanatory variables used to test the existence of market discipline 
in the CE deposit market; CV is a set of explanatory variables designed to control for other 
important bank-specific determinants of the dependent variable; OS is a set of binary 
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variables encoding the ownership structures of banks operating in the CE economies; PF is a 
set of variables describing the fundamentals of parent company s; RM is a set of variables 
capturing market rumours regarding the financial health of parent company s during the recent 
crisis; PH is a set of variables identifying parent companies that received public aid during the 
recent crisis; and itEXPINTEREST ,_  is a variable reflecting bank interest costs. Model (1) 
also includes dummies controlling for specific conditions in year t in country k (TCD).   
The model parameters are estimated using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM-
SYS) procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This method was previously used in 
the context of market discipline testing, such as that conducted by Hadad et al. (2011) and 
Oliveira et al. (2011). In contrast to other panel model estimators (such as the fixed effects or 
random effects estimators), the GMM-SYS enables us to remove the strict exogeneity 
assumption for regressors and thus to include the lagged dependent variable among these 
regressors. In our research, we assume that most of the bank fundamentals are correlated with 
the past shocks to the dependent variable. Because the removal of the strict exogeneity 
assumption implies that the feedback effect running from the dependent variable to the other 
variables is allowed, we permit the regressors mentioned above to be only sequentially 
exogenous. We therefore use suitably lagged values of these regressors as instrumental 
variables in the equations in first differences and the first differences of these regressors in the 
equations in levels. Other regressors, including binary variables encoding the ownership 
structures, variables describing the fundamentals of the parent company, variables capturing 
market rumours concerning the parent company, variables identifying parent companies that 
received public aid, and time and country dummy variables, are treated as strictly exogenous. 
 We base our statistical inferences regarding the significance of parameters on the one-
step estimator, as simulations performed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) suggest that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step estimator can be a poor 
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guide for hypothesis testing, especially in case of heteroscedastic error components. The 
appropriateness of a set of instruments we use is formally evaluated by the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for error autocorrelation. We compute 
the Sargan test using the two-step GMM-SYS estimator, as the Sargan test based on the one-
step estimator is not heteroscedasticity-consistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Doornik and 
Hendry, 2009). 
Table 1 presents the construction of the independent variables in detail. Hence, we will 
concentrate our analysis on two topics: the expected influence of these variables and their 
connection with the hypotheses. We use three bank-specific variables to test H1. If depositors 
observe bank risk, high profitability (OROA) and solid capital base (EQUITY) should increase 
deposit growth rates. In contrast, an elevated share of risky assets (LOANS) should have a 
negative impact on the dependent variable. To check whether deposit volume sensitivity 
changed during the recent crisis (i.e., to verify H2), we examine interactions of the OROA, 
EQUITY, and LOANS variables with the binary variable CRISIS that encodes the years from 
2007 to 2009.  
The quality of our depositor discipline tests depends critically on the composition of the 
set of variables controlling for other important deposit growth rate determinants. This set is 
composed of three elements. First, as equation (1) indicates, we introduce the lagged 
dependent variable (DEPOSIT_GR) and the variable reflecting contemporaneous interest 
costs (INTEREST_EXP). We assume that inertia in deposit inflows and moral hazard will 
result in positive signs of the coefficients estimated for these variables. Second, we control for 
bank characteristics, such as the quality of management (CIR), the dominating retail or 
wholesale component of activities (NCI_SHARE and RELAT_FIXED_ASSETS), and the scale 
of operations (ASSETS). We expect positive signs of parameters for ASSETS and 
RELAT_FIXED_ASSETS, and a negative sign of the coefficient for NCI_SHARE because 
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large and retail banks usually report more rapid deposit growth rates than other banks. The 
lack of strict control of non-interest costs (i.e., high CIR values) is a trait of bad management 
and thus should be negatively correlated with the dependent variable. Third, the literature on 
privatisation and on ownership significance in developing economies suggests that foreign-
owned banks follow more aggressive growth strategies and that government-owned banks 
suffer from corporate governance problems (Shleifer, 1998; Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006; 
Haselman, 2006). Therefore, we forecast that, ceteris paribus, foreign-owned banks (FGN) 
should attract more deposits than private domestic banks, whereas government-controlled 
banks (GOV) should attract fewer deposits than private domestic banks. In addition, the 
interactions of the ownership dummy variables with the CRISIS variable provide us with an 
opportunity to test H4.  
As we mentioned earlier, CE banking systems, which are dominated by foreign-owned 
entities, constitute an ideal laboratory for the study of the impact of parent companies’ 
financial conditions on subsidiaries’ chances to successfully compete in deposit markets. The 
market discipline theory implies that subsidiaries controlled by parent companies with a solid 
capital base (PAR_EQUITY), high profitability (PAR_ROA), and low share of risky assets 
(PAR_LOANS) should enjoy more favourable deposit growth rates. Similarly, growth in 
profitability (PAR_ROA_GROTWH) or in a capital base (PAR_EQUITY_GROWTH) should 
produce higher deposit inflows. Because parent company fundamentals are most likely 
directly observed only by a very limited number of depositors, we include in our regressions 
three variables describing mass-media rumours regarding the financial health of parent 
companies. The first variable is based on the percentage of negative pieces of information out 
of the total media coverage (PAR_NEG_COV). The second (PAR_NEG_COV_50) and third 
(PAR_NUM_NEG_50) are binary variables identifying the parent companies that rank among 
the 50% of parent companies with the highest proportion of negative coverage and among the 
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50% of parent companies with the highest number of negative pieces of information, 
respectively. We expect that all the variables based on rumours will affect deposit dynamics 
negatively. The use of several variables indicating the condition of parent companies allows 
us to thoroughly test H3 and H5.  
As we explained earlier, the influence of the state aid received by certain foreign parent 
companies on depositors’ decisions is theoretically ambiguous in CE countries. H6 claims 
that the positive and negative effects of state aid will offset. To fully investigate the role of 
state aid, we define three binary variables. These variables identify the parent companies that 
received public help, but they differ in the assumed time frames of the public aid effects. For 
the group of parent companies that received public aid, the first variable (PAR_HELP1) 
equals one for all years of the recent crisis, the second (PAR_HELP2) equals one for the year 
in which the public aid occurred and all subsequent years, and the third (PAR_HELP3) equals 
one only for the year in which the aid occurred.  
[Table 1 here] 
 
4. Data set 
Our study spans the period from 1994 to 2009 and addresses the commercial banks 
operating in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We use the abbreviation “banks” for these entities. 
All of the bank-specific financial information was obtained from the BankScope database. 
Based on these data, we constructed a panel of 4125 bank-year observations for 416 banks. 
With regard to the information on bank ownership structures we updated previous findings by 
Bonin et al. (2005), Fristch et al. (2007), and Jackowicz et al. (2011) using the annual reports 
of banks, official publications of regulatory bodies, and articles in various newspapers. In the 
final data set, we have 2136 bank-year observations for banks controlled by foreign investors, 
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754 observations for government-owned banks, and 1235 observations for banks owned by 
private domestic investors. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variable and selected explanatory variables.  
[Table 2 here] 
The mean and median values of the real deposit growth rate are equal to 19.27% and 
12.11%, respectively. The distribution of the real deposit growth rate is also characterised by 
a high standard deviation. For a majority of banks, the interest cost ratios expressed in real 
terms are negative, which means that bank deposits in the CE countries offered only weak 
protection against inflation. The average share of the loans to non-financial companies 
amounts to 48%. The median value of the LOANS variable is almost identical. The mean and 
median returns on assets measured on the level of operating income are equal to 6.85% and 
5.88%, respectively. The standard deviation calculated for OROA is relatively small, in 
contrast to the standard deviation for real deposit growth rates. The median bank in our 
sample financed 10.69% of its assets with equity capital.  
For the foreign-owned banks, we identified the majority shareholders. We concentrated 
our analysis on financial parent companies for two reasons. First, financial owners are by far 
the most important category of foreign owners in CE countries. Second, this group of owners 
was the most severely impacted by the recent financial crisis. We managed to identify 93 
financial parent companies. Because many parent companies exercised control over multiple 
subsidiaries for prolonged periods, we have at our disposal 1893 parent-subsidiary-year 
observations. The remainder of the observations for the foreign-owned banks concerns banks 
possessed by non-financial companies, banks with dispersed shareholders, banks owned by 
wealthy individuals, or banks with missing detailed data on ownership structure. Figure 1 
shows the number of parent companies with an average yearly number of controlled 
subsidiaries comprised within a given range. We find that the number of parent companies 
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controlling more than three subsidiaries in the CE countries each year is quite limited. Table 3 
presents the distribution of parent-subsidiary-year observations according to the country of 
origin of a parent company. It turns out that the banks from Austria, France, Germany, Italy, 
and Sweden were the most active in establishing their presence in CE markets.  
[Figure 1 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
We retrieved the financial statements of parent companies also from the BankScope 
database. Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the parent companies. The owners are 
characterised by significantly lower equity levels than the banks operating in CE countries. 
By contrast, the mean and median shares of loans in parent company assets are higher and 
exceed 53%. The average long-term profitability for the parent companies is low. The mean 
and median returns on assets, as measured on the level of net income, do not surpass 1%.  
[Table 4 here] 
To test H3 and H5, we needed information regarding market rumours. We accessed and 
utilised the Reuters news service for this purpose. First, we identified the total number of 
pieces of information concerning a given parent company during each year of the recent 
crisis. Next, we determined the number and share of negative pieces of information. We 
classified a piece of information as negative when it contained at least one of the following 
key words or phrases: loss, capital injection, state aid, restructuring, or emergency. We 
acknowledge that our automated procedures may lead to erroneous classifications. However, 
we manually verified the quality of classifications for a small subsample of parent companies, 
for which the automated procedures described above worked quite well.  
We compiled the information on public aid received by parent companies from several 
sources. Our main sources were the reports prepared by the Bank for International Settlements 
(2009) and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
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(2009). These sources were verified and complemented by articles from The Banker and 
information contained in parent companies’ annual reports. We considered several different 
forms of public aid; namely, stock purchases, troubled asset removals, and the granting of 
emergency loans. 
The information on changes in safety net arrangements in CE countries was derived 
from the Financial Stability Board publications (2009; 2010). These sources were verified 
and complemented by information available on the Internet.  
In Sections 5 and 6, the actual number of bank-year observations drops below 3000. 
There are three reasons for this decrease. First, our econometric approach relies on lagged 
variables and instruments. As a result, banks with only a short time series are eliminated. 
Second, certain values of the explanatory variables are missing due to shortcomings of the 
BankScope database. Third, clearly erroneous values of the explanatory variables were 
eliminated from the sample, such as values of the ASSETS variable that were higher than the 
ratio of banking system assets to GDP in a given country.  
 
5. Empirical results 
In Table 5, we investigate the question of whether the fundamentals of banks and 
foreign parent companies affect the growth of deposits. As Table 5 documents, our models 
possess good econometric properties. In all specifications in the Sargan test, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis regarding the validity of the instruments. The critical assumption of no 
serial correlation in the disturbances ( itv , ) is fulfilled in this study. As required by this 
assumption, we find significant negative first order serial correlation in the differenced 
residuals (the AR(1) test), and no evidence of second order serial correlation in the 
differenced residuals (the AR(2) test). Independent variables (excluding time and country 
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dummies) are jointly statistically significant at the level lower than 1%. In addition, usually at 
least five variables are individually significant.  
The bank-specific control variables only partially influence the deposit growth in the 
expected directions. The poorly managed banks with high values of the CIR variable record 
lower deposit dynamics by a statistically significant margin. The large banks attract more 
deposits, but this effect is not statistically significant in all specifications presented in Table 5. 
Interestingly, the deposit growth is also slower for retail banks, as the estimated coefficient 
for the RELAT_FIXED_ASSETS variable is negative and significant. This outcome can be 
explained by the more cautious growth strategies followed by retail banks in comparison with 
wholesale banks and banks with more balanced structures of activities. The lagged dependent 
variable and the contemporaneous interest cost ratio, as forecasted, positively impact the 
deposit growth. However, this influence is not statistically significant. Therefore, contrary to 
Kraft and Galac (2007), we do not find evidence that banks in CE countries are able to fund 
rapid expansion by offering high deposit rates.  
The results of H1 verification are mixed. Two observations support the hypothesis that 
depositors discipline banks’ decisions in the CE countries. First, the equity levels are 
positively related to the growth of deposits. Moreover, the coefficients obtained for EQUITY 
variable are stable and significant at the levels lower than 1%. Second, there is some evidence 
that more profitable banks report higher deposit growth rates. The OROA variable is 
significant at the conventional levels only in two out of nine specifications in Table 5, but in 
the remaining specifications, the p-values are close to the 10% threshold. Contrary to the 
expectations based on the market discipline theory, the share of loans in assets influences the 
dependent variable positively and significantly. This relationship can be interpreted as proof 
of weakness in market discipline. Alternatively, the positive parameter for the LOANS 
variable can be explained by the fact that banks that adhere to more aggressive investment 
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policies also pursue more aggressive growth strategies. In summary, we establish that traces 
of depositor discipline are detectable in emerging markets even when the vast majority of 
depositors is formally insured. This result is similar to those obtained by Peria and Schmukler 
(2001), Jackowicz (2004), and Önder and Özyildrim (2008).  
 The relationships between bank fundamentals and deposit growth rates remain 
unchanged when we introduce (in specification 2) the following interaction terms: 
EQUITY_x_CRISIS, OROA_x_CRISIS, and LOANS_x_CRISIS. All the coefficients estimated 
for the interaction terms are insignificant. This outcome falsifies H2 and suggests that the 
recent crisis did not alter the sensitivity of deposit growth ratios to accounting bank risk 
measures.  
The coefficients obtained for the GOV variable are negative in all specifications and the 
coefficients obtained for the FGN variable are positive in all specifications. However, in the 
entire sample the ownership structure does not influence deposit growth statistically 
significantly. The results, therefore, do not support the view that foreign-owned banks enjoy a 
reputational advantage in CE countries (Kraft and Galac, 2007). Our conclusions are the same 
when we allow the coefficients for the GOV and FGN variables to take different values during 
the recent crisis, as the interaction terms GOV_x_CRISIS and FGN_x_CRISIS are also 
insignificant (specification 3). This evidence proves that the recent crisis did not 
indiscriminately worsen the situation of foreign-owned banks and improve the situation of 
state-owned banks. The empirical results thus contradict H4.     
Specifications (4), (5), and (6) in Table 5 demonstrate that in the CE countries, foreign 
parent company fundamentals generally do not influence depositors’ decisions. During the 
recent crisis, this outcome changes only slightly. In specification (7), the parent company’s 
equity level begins to positively and significantly influence deposit growth recorded by a 
subsidiary. The remainder of the variables illustrating parent company financial health remain 
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insignificant. The evidence that during the recent crisis foreign-owned banks controlled by 
distressed owners had difficulties in attracting new deposits (as stated in H3) is therefore very 
weak when we use fundamentals to identify distressed parent companies.  
[Table 5 here] 
In Table 6, we turn our attention to the role of rumours concerning the parent company’s 
financial situation. As Table 6 documents, our models again possess good econometric 
properties, thus implying that the estimates create a good base from which to draw inferences.  
In this table, the variables pertaining to banks operating in the CE countries change neither 
their directions of influence nor their strength of impact on deposit growth ratios. We observe 
only three minor differences in this table in comparison with Table 5. First, the OROA 
variable more frequently significantly augments the deposit growth ratios. Second, the 
variable measuring banks’ scale of operations is statistically significant in all specifications. 
Third, in specifications (11) and (12), we find that foreign-owned banks in general are 
characterised by higher deposit growth rates.  
During non-crisis periods, parent companies’ fundamentals remain insignificant. By 
contrast, in the last three years of the studied period, as specifications (16) – (18) document, 
the capital base and profitability of a parent company are statistically significantly related to 
subsidiaries’ deposits growth when we control for the influence of rumours. Although the 
PAR_EQUITY_x_CRISIS variable influences the dependent variable in the expected direction, 
the sign of the coefficient for PAR_ROA_x_CRISIS variable is at odds with that predicted by 
the traditional market discipline theory. The latter variable is, however, statistically significant 
only at the 10% level.  
In Table 6, we establish that rumours regarding the conditions of foreign parent 
companies played an important role during the recent crisis. Regardless of the methods we 
use to measure rumours, the independent variables based on rumours are significant at the 1% 
 20
level. The significance of these variables does not diminish when we control for parent 
companies’ fundamentals in the entire sample (specifications (13) - (15)), nor is it affected 
when we allow parent companies’ fundamentals to influence deposit growth rates in a 
different manner during the recent crisis (specifications (16) - (18)). The impact of rumours 
on deposit dynamics is also economically significant. Ceteris paribus, a ten percentage points 
rise in the negative coverage results in a deposit growth rate that is almost three percentage 
points lower. Having a parent company classified among the 50% of parent companies with 
the highest negative coverage percentages or the highest number of negative pieces of 
information translates, again, ceteris paribus, into deposit growth rates that are reduced by 
almost 18 percentage points and 15 percentage points, respectively.  
Thus, we conclude that rumours pertaining to the conditions of foreign-parent 
companies possess a significant autonomous role in explaining depositors’ behaviour. 
Moreover, during the crisis, the negative influence of rumours is stronger and more stable 
than the impact of parent companies’ fundamentals. In summary, our evidence supports H5 
and H3 when we utilise a rumour-based definition of distressed parent companies. Our results 
therefore corroborate previous findings by Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004) and Forssbaeck (2011). 
[Table 6 here] 
Table 7 presents the empirical results regarding the importance of public aid received by 
certain parent companies included in our sample. The econometric properties of the estimated 
models as well as the coefficient signs and significance levels for bank-specific variables 
remain unchanged.  
In general terms, public help is interpreted by depositors as a confirmation that the 
parent company is encountering financial difficulties. The coefficients estimated for the 
PAR_HELP1, PAR_HELP2, and PAR_HELP3 variables are always negative. However, these 
coefficients are statistically significant only in five out of nine cases. The results in Table 7, in 
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contrast to the evidence concerning market rumours, therefore display a sensitivity to the 
method by which we encode public aid and construct models. According to specifications 
(20) and (21), ceteris paribus, public aid received by the parent company lowers the deposit 
growth rates recorded by a subsidiary by approximately 13 percentage points in the year of 
public aid announcements and for subsequent years. The inclusion of variables illustrating 
parent company fundamentals in specification (23) and (24) does not modify this outcome. 
However, interesting changes to our results occur when we allow parent company 
fundamentals to influence the dependent variable differently for the groups of entities that 
received and did not receive public help (specifications (25)-(27)). Under these conditions, the 
variable PAR_HELP1 gains statistical significance, whereas the variables PAR_HELP2 and 
PAR_HELP3 lose their significance. At the same time, we establish that a relatively healthy 
capital base of parent companies that received public aid has a significant positive influence 
on the deposit growth rates reported by its subsidiaries operating in the CE countries 
(specifications (25) and (27)).  
The empirical evidence contained in Table 7 therefore contradicts H6. Public aid 
received by a parent company constitutes a negative piece of information, at least as far as the 
deposit growth rates recorded by its subsidiaries are concerned. Moreover, our results suggest 
that when we control for parent companies’ fundamentals during the recent crisis, mass-media 
rumours provide more incremental information than do public aid announcements.  
[Table 7 here] 
 
6. Robustness checks 
We perform four robustness checks. First, we verify whether our results are sensitive to 
the estimation procedure. For this purpose, we estimate random effects versions of our 
dynamic panel models. Table 8 shows that our results exhibit moderate sensitivity to the 
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choice of estimation procedure. The results confirm previous findings that deposit growth is 
strongly negatively affected by mass media rumours about the financial health of parent 
companies. The same applies to the informational content of public help announcements 
because the coefficients estimated for the variables PAR_HELP1, PAR_HELP2, and 
PAR_HELP3 are negative and statistically significant, as in Section 5. Parent companies’ 
fundamentals remain unimportant for depositors’ decisions in CE countries. The most 
noticeable changes concern bank-specific variables. The outcome of the traditional market 
discipline test is less ambiguous. According to the results in Table 8, banks with a stronger 
capital base and higher profitability have statistically significantly easier access to the deposit 
market. When we substitute static panel models for dynamic models, the variables describing 
deposit interest costs and lagged deposit growth gain statistical significance. Moreover, these 
variables impact the dependent variable in the expected directions.  
 [Table 8 here] 
Second, in Table 9, we replace the lagged variables describing the risk of parent 
companies and banks with contemporaneous variables. This exercise does not change our 
conclusion concerning the role of mass media rumours and public aid announcements. Parent 
companies’ fundamentals still do not play an important role in depositors’ decision-making 
processes. However, there is an indication in Table 9 (specification 36) that during the recent 
crisis, a strong capital base of a parent company, as in specification (7), was positively 
correlated with the deposit growth ratios recorded by its subsidiaries. Similar to the first 
robustness check, the most interesting changes occur with regard to bank-specific variables. 
As predicted by the market discipline theory, banks with riskier assets and lower profitability 
attract fewer deposits. The change in the coefficients estimated for the variable EQUITY can 
be easily explained by the mechanical balance sheet relationship between the deposit growth 
rates and the equity share at the end of a fiscal year. Altogether, the empirical evidence in 
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Table 9 is more supportive of H1 than is the evidence in Section 5.  In contrast to the cases 
when we use the lagged variables, the coefficient estimated for the variable INTEREST_EXP 
is now positive and statistically significant. This suggests that depositors’ actions in CE 
countries are affected by moral hazard.  
[Table 9 here] 
Third, public authorities in CE countries reacted to the first stage of the recent crisis in a 
partially uncoordinated manner. Hence, there is a possibility that differences in safety net 
changes distort our empirical findings. To account for this factor, we introduce two additional 
variables. The variable NONFULLGUAR equals one for countries that did not provide blanket 
guarantees for bank liabilities after 2007 and zero otherwise. The binary variable 
LOWCOVMULTP identifies countries that were characterised after 2007 by a below-median 
increase in deposit insurance limits. We measure the mentioned increase using a coverage 
multiplier calculated as a quotient of the coverage limit in a given year to the coverage limit 
binding in 2007. To retest the hypotheses, we interact the variables NONFULLGUAR and 
LOWCOVMULTP with the variables describing the risk of banks and their ownership 
structures. For the sake of brevity, Table 10 presents only selected models controlling for 
differences in safety net modifications. The results of the H1, H3, H5, and H6 verifications 
remain unchanged. In contrast, the tests of H2 and H4 are fine-tuned by the new empirical 
evidence. As specification (43) demonstrates, in the entire sample, the recent crisis did not 
increase depositors’ sensitivity to the fundamentals of banks. However, in the sub-group of 
countries with low increases in deposit coverage limits, a solid capital base of a bank begins 
to play a more important role. As specification (44) indicates, government-owned banks did 
not benefit from the uncertainty pertaining to the financial conditions of foreign-owned banks, 
with one exception. In countries with low increases in coverage limits, government-controlled 
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banks reported statistically and economically significant higher deposit growth rates during 
the recent crisis.  
[Table 10 here] 
Fourth, some parent companies in our sample enjoy a too big to fail status. In Table 11 
we control for this factor. We introduce two binary variables: PAR_TBTF and PAR_TBTFa. 
They equal one when the parent company ratio of assets to GDP exceeds 25% and 50%, 
respectively. The too big to fail status does not influence the dependent variable differently 
during the recent crisis in comparison with other periods since the interaction terms: 
PAR_TBTF_x_CRISIS and PAR_TBTFa_x_CRISIS are insignificant. However, in the entire 
sample banks controlled by big parent companies report significantly lower deposit growth 
rates. We conjecture that this relationship arises from the fact that big foreign-investors 
acquired usually more mature banking organisations in CE countries.  
[Table 11 here] 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Market discipline has the potential to play a vital role in promoting financial stability. It 
may encourage banks to augment capital adequacy and to choose safer asset structures. 
Market discipline can improve also, as Ferguson and Stevenson (2007) explain, banks’ 
incentives to monitor borrowers. In CE countries, depositor discipline is the only viable and 
universal source of market discipline in banking, for three reasons. First, the market for 
banks’ subordinated debt is virtually nonexistent. Second, only selected banks are listed on 
regional stock exchanges. Third, shareholders’ goals do not have to coincide with the interests 
of either the public as a whole or depositors in particular (Bliss and Flannery, 2001; Park and 
Peristiani, 2001; Gropp and Vesala, 2001). Unfortunately, from the perspective of 
successfully supplementing regulatory discipline with market discipline in emerging 
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economies, our results are ambiguous. The evidence supporting the claim that bank 
accounting risk measures influence deposit growth rates in socially desired ways is weak. 
Government-owned banks benefited from the uncertainty concerning foreign-owned banks 
and their parent companies only in countries with relatively low increases in deposit insurance 
limits. Moreover, the sensitivity of deposit growth rates to the fundamentals of banks did not 
augment during the recent crisis, and the sensitivity to parent companies’ fundamentals 
increased only marginally. By contrast, depositors’ decisions during the recent crisis were 
strongly affected by press rumours with regard to the financial health of parent companies. 
The last empirical outcome deserves closer examination since there are two possible 
interpretations. If we assume that decisions based on rumours are worse for financial stability 
than decisions based on fundamentals, we obtain one more proof of depositor discipline 
weakness. However, rumours may convey more relevant information than financial 
statements during crisis periods. In this case, depositors’ sensitivities to rumours constitute an 
encouraging signal for market discipline proponents. To verify the veracity of these 
interpretations, one needs to investigate thoroughly informational content of mass-media 
rumours. Such analyses lie beyond the scope of the present paper. Our research results have 
implications not only for policymakers, but also for bank managers. These results provide an 
important reminder that rumours related to a parent company’s financial situation or the 
public aid received by a parent company can seriously reduce deposit growth rates, even for 
financially healthy subsidiaries. 
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Table 1. Explanatory variables and their definitions  
Explanatory variable  Definition Type Lag 
    
DEPOSIT_GR The real growth rate of deposits from non-financial entities SE L 
INTEREST_EXP A ratio of interest costs and liabilities SE C 
    
OROA The return on assets, measured on the level of operating income SE L 
EQUITY A ratio of equity capital and assets  SE L 
LOANS A share of loans in total assets SE L 
    
CIR Cost to income ratio SE C 
NCI_SHARE A share of net commission and fee incomes in operating income SE C 
ASSETS A ratio of a given bank's assets and the GDP of the country in which the bank is licensed  SE C 
RELAT_FIXED_ASSETS 
A variable equal to one for the bank with the biggest 
fixed assets in a given year and country. For the 
other banks, the variable shows the relative scale of 
fixed assets.  
E C 
    
GOV 
A binary variable identifying banks that were 
directly or indirectly controlled by the government in 
a given year 
E C 
FGN A binary variable identifying banks that were owned by foreign investors in a given year E C 
    
CRISIS A binary variable equal to one for the years from 2007 to 2009 and equal to zero for the other years E C 
    
PAR_EQUITY A ratio of equity capital and assets calculated for parent companies E L 
PAR_ROA The return on assets calculated for parent companies E L 
 32
PAR_LOANS A share of loans in total assets calculated for parent companies E L 
PAR_ROA_GROTWH A growth ratio for the PAR_ROA variable  E  
PAR_EQUITY_GROWTH A growth ratio for the PAR_EQUITY variable E  
    
PAR_NEG_COV 
A percentage of negative pieces of information out 
of total number of press coverage for a given parent 
company in a given year 
E C 
PAR_NEG_COV_50 
A binary variable identifying the 50% of parent 
companies with the highest values of 
PAR_NEG_COV variable values in a given year 
E C 
PAR_NUM_NEG_50 
A binary variable identifying the 50% of parent 
companies in a given year with the highest number 
of negative pieces of information 
E C 
    
PAR_HELP1 
For the group of parent companies that received 
public aid, this binary variable is equal to one in all 
years of the recent crisis 
E C 
PAR_HELP2 
For the group of parent companies that received 
public aid, this binary variable is equal to one for the 
year in which the public aid occurred and subsequent 
years 
E C 
PAR_HELP3 
For the group of parent companies that received 
public aid this binary variable is equal to one only in 
the year in which the public aid occurred 
E C 
Note: The symbol SE denotes sequentially exogenous variables, whereas E denotes strictly exogenous variables,  
L denotes lagged variables, and C denotes contemporaneous variables. 
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Table 2. The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and the selected explanatory 
variables 
 
  
DEPOSIT_ 
GR 
INTEREST_
EXP OROA LOANS EQUITY 
Mean 19.72% -1.98% 6.85% 47.74% 14.75% 
Median 12.11% -0.85% 5.88% 48.28% 10.69% 
Standard deviation 41.62% 4.82% 4.39% 20.75% 13.64% 
10th percentile  -18.80% -7.94% 2.76% 20.17% 5.12% 
90th percentile 70.12% 2.58% 12.40% 74.32% 28.00% 
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Figure 1. The number of financial parent companies with a given average yearly number of 
subsidiaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 (1;2> (2;3> (3;4> (4;5> (5;6> more than 6
average yearly number of subsidiaries
nu
m
be
r o
f p
ar
en
t c
om
pa
ni
es
 35
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Distribution of parent-subsidiary-year observations according to a parent company’s country of origin  
 Subsidiary operate in 
Parent company 
from 
BULGARIA CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC ESTONIA HUNGARY LATVIA LITHUANIA POLAND ROMANIA SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA
AUSTRIA 10.4% 44.7% 37.0% 0.0% 23.4% 0.0% 0.0% 6.5% 15.5% 41.1% 64.0% 
BELGIUM 0.0% 0.0% 9.7% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 0.0% 14.1% 0.0% 
CYPRUS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
FINLAND 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 3.0% 13.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
FRANCE 19.3% 2.7% 11.7% 0.0% 15.4% 0.0% 0.0% 12.4% 8.8% 8.1% 17.4% 
GERMANY 5.2% 17.3% 24.9% 0.0% 24.7% 13.1% 4.9% 30.1% 3.6% 9.7% 7.0% 
GREECE 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 27.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
ITALY 10.4% 32.0% 6.2% 0.0% 11.2% 5.1% 8.2% 7.8% 12.4% 10.8% 11.6% 
LATVIA 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
NETHERLANDS 5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 11.6% 10.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
NORWAY 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 8.2% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
RUSSIA 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.9% 0.0% 24.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
SWEDEN 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 57.1% 0.0% 32.3% 44.3% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
UKRAINE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
USA 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 0.0% 8.0% 4.0% 0.0% 7.0% 5.7% 7.6% 0.0% 
OTHER COUNTRIES 9.6% 3.3% 0.0% 2.4% 9.9% 1.0% 4.9% 15.1% 14.9% 8.6% 0.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The descriptive statistics for parent companies 
 
  PAR_EQUITY PAR_LOANS PAR_ROA 
Mean 6.35% 53.04% 0.62% 
Median 4.81% 53.01% 0.49% 
Standard deviation 5.51% 17.22% 1.60% 
10th percentile  2.68% 33.32% 0.00% 
90th percentile 11.24% 75.66% 1.59% 
 
 
Table 5. The impact of bank and parent company fundamentals on deposit growth rates 
 
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   
DDEPOSIT_GR 0.019  0.018  0.019  0.015  0.027  0.025  0.014  0.027  0.023  
 0.025  0.025  0.025  0.024  0.025  0.026  0.025  0.026  0.025  
           
DINTEREST_EXP 1.432  1.367  1.442  1.477  0.941  1.213  1.366  0.941  1.154  
 1.176  1.190  1.178  1.178  1.131  1.153  1.183  1.131  1.139  
           
DOROA 1.043  1.064  1.041  1.170 * 1.123  1.025  1.174 * 1.120  1.067  
 0.671  0.752  0.670  0.688  0.688  0.673  0.692  0.687  0.675  
DLOANS 0.327 ** 0.238 * 0.330 *** 0.311 ** 0.307 ** 0.314 ** 0.318 ** 0.306 ** 0.319 ** 
 0.129  0.128  0.128  0.128  0.133  0.131  0.125  0.132  0.130  
DEQUITY 0.943 *** 0.883 *** 0.941 *** 0.940 *** 1.001 *** 1.015 *** 0.930 *** 1.001 *** 1.012 *** 
 0.249  0.259  0.248  0.247  0.257  0.256  0.248  0.257  0.254  
DLOANS _X_CRISIS   0.213                
   0.177                
DEQUITY_X_CRISIS   0.133                
   0.378                
DOROA_X_CRISIS   0.089                
   1.509                
           
DCIR -0.182 ** -0.186 *** -0.181 ** -0.169 ** -0.192 *** -0.188 ** -0.178 ** -0.192 *** -0.184 ** 
 0.073  0.069  0.073  0.074  0.075  0.075  0.073  0.075  0.076  
DNCI_SHARE 0.228  0.240  0.227  0.192  0.214  0.252  0.214  0.216  0.251  
 0.188  0.178  0.189  0.189  0.180  0.189  0.188  0.180  0.189  
DRELAT_FIXED_ASSETS -0.168 *** -0.167 *** -0.169 *** -0.181 *** -0.101 * -0.169 *** -0.187 *** -0.102 * -0.171 *** 
 0.061  0.059  0.061  0.061  0.059  0.062  0.061  0.059  0.062  
DASSETS 0.636 * 0.589  0.643 * 0.737 ** 0.241  0.612 * 0.768 ** 0.244  0.626 * 
 0.366  0.361  0.365  0.365  0.348  0.363  0.367  0.348  0.367  
                   
Dgov -0.029  -0.029  -0.032  -0.030  -0.021  -0.024  -0.032  -0.021  -0.023  
 0.033  0.032  0.034  0.033  0.033  0.034  0.033  0.033  0.034  
Dfgn 0.031  0.031  0.030  0.006  0.027  0.033  0.005  0.027  0.035  
 0.024  0.024  0.028  0.034  0.024  0.025  0.033  0.024  0.025  
 39
DGOV_X_CRISIS     0.020              
     0.069              
DFGN_X_CRISIS     0.004              
     0.045              
           
DPAR_EQUITY       1.237      0.015      
       0.935      1.054      
DPAR_LOANS       -0.057      0.012      
       0.092      0.096      
DPAR_ROA       -0.618      2.557      
       3.142      3.802      
DPAR_EQUITY_GROWTH         0.068      0.065    
         0.057      0.067    
DPAR_ROA_GROWTH           1.060      -1.209  
           2.292      3.612  
DPAR_ROA_GROWTH_X_CRISIS                 4.437  
                 4.882  
DPAR_EQUITY_GROWTH_X_CRISIS               0.012    
               0.137    
DPAR_EQUITY_X_CRISIS             3.141 **     
             1.524      
DPAR_LOANS_X_CRISIS             -0.208      
             0.134      
DPAR_ROA_X_CRISIS             -7.647      
             4.859      
           
Constant -0.144  -0.109  -0.143  -0.157  -0.190  -0.159  -0.144  -0.190  -0.164  
  0.120   0.120   0.121   0.121   0.128   0.124   0.123   0.127   0.125   
           
no. of observations 2353  2353  2353  2351  2305  2333  2351  2305  2333  
Wald (joint) 83.87 *** 94.28 *** 85.5 *** 88.89 *** 75.08 *** 81.57 *** 92.86 *** 74.94 *** 81.62 *** 
Sargan test (two-step) 136.9  132.4  131.8  135.7  155.7  140.1  130.7  150.8  140.6  
AR(1) test -8.816 *** -8.825 *** -8.811 *** -8.785 *** -8.561 *** -8.729 *** -8.785 *** -8.562 *** -8.738 *** 
AR(2) test 0.4979   0.5016   0.4935   0.5742   0.3444   0.2368   0.5647   0.3424   0.2775   
This table presents the one-step GMM-SYS estimates. The robust standard errors are given under the coefficients.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. The impact of rumours concerning parent companies on deposit growth rates 
 
  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18   
DDEPOSIT_GR 0.017  0.015  0.016  0.013  0.011  0.013  0.011  0.010  0.011  
 0.025  0.025  0.025  0.024  0.024  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  
                   
DINTEREST_EXP 1.431  1.429  1.439  1.488  1.478  1.490  1.318  1.247  1.287  
 1.172  1.173  1.177  1.177  1.177  1.181  1.179  1.174  1.186  
                   
DOROA 1.051  1.077  1.082  1.183 * 1.191 * 1.199 * 1.190 * 1.192 * 1.205 * 
 0.669  0.669  0.667  0.685  0.686  0.684  0.689  0.688  0.686  
DLOANS 0.325 ** 0.321 ** 0.321 ** 0.306 ** 0.307 ** 0.306 ** 0.314 ** 0.317 ** 0.316 ** 
 0.129  0.129  0.129  0.129  0.129  0.128  0.127  0.127  0.127  
DEQUITY 0.952 *** 0.966 *** 0.962 *** 0.952 *** 0.963 *** 0.959 *** 0.940 *** 0.948 *** 0.945 *** 
 0.248  0.248  0.248  0.246  0.246  0.246  0.248  0.248  0.247  
                   
DCIR -0.183 ** -0.186 *** -0.184 ** -0.169 ** -0.172 ** -0.171 ** -0.177 ** -0.181 ** -0.179 ** 
 0.074  0.072  0.072  0.075  0.073  0.073  0.073  0.071  0.071  
DNCI_SHARE 0.218  0.233  0.233  0.184  0.195  0.196  0.210  0.229  0.228  
 0.188  0.188  0.188  0.189  0.189  0.189  0.188  0.189  0.188  
DRELAT_FIXED_ASSETS -0.174 *** -0.171 *** -0.171 *** -0.188 *** -0.186 *** -0.185 *** -0.190 *** -0.183 *** -0.185 *** 
 0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.063  0.062  
DASSETS 0.673 * 0.715 * 0.701 * 0.778 ** 0.830 ** 0.814 ** 0.773 ** 0.809 ** 0.806 ** 
 0.369  0.374  0.372  0.369  0.375  0.373  0.371  0.380  0.378  
                   
DGOV -0.028  -0.029  -0.029  -0.029  -0.030  -0.030  -0.031  -0.034  -0.033  
 0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  
DFGN 0.040  0.048 * 0.045 * 0.011  0.016  0.015  0.012  0.021  0.019  
 0.025  0.026  0.026  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.033  0.033  0.033  
                   
DPAR_EQUITY       1.295  1.349  1.324  -0.043  0.000  0.001  
       0.938  0.949  0.945  1.058  1.053  1.052  
DPAR_LOANS       -0.047  -0.050  -0.052  0.007  -0.016  -0.011  
       0.091  0.091  0.091  0.096  0.095  0.095  
DPAR_ROA       -0.934  -0.868  -0.817  2.667  2.753  2.713  
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       3.193  3.185  3.172  3.785  3.770  3.773   
DPAR_EQUITY_X_CRISIS             3.070 ** 2.835 * 2.897 ** 
             1.560  1.449  1.458  
DPAR_LOANS_X_CRISIS             -0.097  -0.001  -0.043  
             0.135  0.128  0.135   
DPAR_ROA_X_CRISIS             -9.107 * -9.013 * -8.728 * 
             5.028  4.725  4.752  
                   
DPAR_NEG_COV -0.209 ***    -0.221 ***    -0.279 ***     
 0.076      0.080      0.084      
DPAR_NEG_COV_50   -0.133 ***    -0.135 ***    -0.178 ***  
   0.042      0.043      0.045    
DPAR_NUM_NEG_50     -0.110 ***    -0.112 ***     -0.146 *** 
     0.039      0.040      0.045  
                   
Constant -0.146  -0.153  -0.153  -0.160  -0.166  -0.166  -0.147  -0.153  -0.154  
  0.119   0.118   0.119   0.121   0.120   0.120   0.122   0.121   0.122   
                   
no. of observations 2353  2353  2353  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  
Wald (joint) 89.77 *** 94.13 *** 90.67 *** 96.63 *** 99.77 *** 95.64 *** 99.22 *** 107.5 *** 100.5 *** 
Sargan test (two-step) 137.6  136.2  135.4  135.4  135.2  134.1  129.3  125.8  125.7  
AR(1) test -8.79 *** -8.777 *** -8.768 *** -8.759 *** -8.742 *** -8.734 *** -8.769 *** -8.752 *** -8.739 *** 
AR(2) test 0.5409   0.4987   0.4924   0.6092   0.5867   0.5785   0.617   0.5921   0.578   
This table presents the one-step GMM-SYS estimates. The robust standard errors are given under the coefficients.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7. The public aid received by parent companies and deposit growth rates 
 
  19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   
DDEPOSIT_GR 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.015 0.014  
 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024  
           
DINTEREST_EXP 1.468 1.441 1.453 1.507 1.517 1.525 1.360 1.516 1.532  
 1.178 1.172 1.175 1.183 1.178 1.180 1.169 1.175 1.179  
           
DOROA 1.054 1.088 1.082 1.181 * 1.206 * 1.207 * 1.211 * 1.222 * 1.219 * 
 0.669 0.668 0.670 0.685 0.684 0.686 0.683 0.690 0.691  
DLOANS 0.321 ** 0.313 ** 0.316 ** 0.306 ** 0.294 ** 0.296 ** 0.310 ** 0.297 ** 0.290 ** 
 0.128 0.128 0.129 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.126 0.127 0.129  
DEQUITY 0.953 *** 0.959 *** 0.954 *** 0.949 *** 0.960 *** 0.953 *** 0.946 *** 0.966 *** 0.958 *** 
 0.249 0.248 0.249 0.247 0.246 0.247 0.243 0.246 0.246  
           
DCIR -0.182 ** -0.176 ** -0.179 ** -0.168 ** -0.164 ** -0.165 ** -0.174 ** -0.166 ** -0.172 ** 
 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.071 0.074 0.073  
DNCI_SHARE 0.224 0.215 0.218 0.189 0.185 0.188 0.216 0.190 0.198  
 0.187 0.187 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.189  
DRELAT_FIXED_ASSETS -0.168 *** -0.169 *** -0.170 *** -0.181 *** -0.181 *** -0.183 *** -0.186 *** -0.181 *** -0.186 *** 
 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.062 0.063  
DASSETS 0.644 * 0.645 * 0.652 * 0.745 ** 0.748 ** 0.754 ** 0.738 ** 0.740 ** 0.759 ** 
 0.368 0.375 0.376 0.367 0.373 0.374 0.365 0.374 0.375  
           
DGOV -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.029  
 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033  
DFGN 0.036 0.039 0.038 0.008 0.014 0.011 0.024 0.014 0.012  
 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.034  
DPAR_EQUITY    1.243 1.238 1.223 0.720 0.995 1.012  
    0.937 0.935 0.935 1.019 1.040 0.977  
DPAR_LOANS    -0.052 -0.047 -0.045 -0.058 -0.033 -0.033  
    0.091 0.090 0.090 0.094 0.094 0.093  
DPAR_ROA    -0.731 -1.298 -1.163 0.626 -0.503 -0.517  
    3.188 3.405 3.334 3.766 3.885 3.584  
           
DPAR_HELP1 -0.038   -0.035   -0.337 ***    
 0.036   0.037   0.091    
DPAR_HELP2  -0.137 ***   -0.132 ***  -0.152   
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  0.039   0.043   0.129   
DPAR_HELP3   -0.133 ***  -0.128 ***  -0.184  
   0.035   0.039   0.139  
DPAR_LOANS_X_PAR_HELP1       0.295    
       0.211    
DPAR_EQUITY_X_PAR_HELP1       4.001 *    
       2.293    
DPAR_ROA_X_PAR_HELP1       -6.215    
       5.102    
DPAR_LOANS_X_PAR_HELP2        -0.127   
        0.331   
DPAR_EQUITY_X_PAR_HELP2        2.005   
        2.416   
DPAR_ROA_X_PAR_HELP2        -3.756   
        5.548   
DPAR_LOANS_X_PAR_HELP3         -0.398  
         0.458  
DPAR_EQUITY_X_PAR_HELP3         5.945 * 
         3.474  
DPAR_ROA_X_PAR_HELP3         -6.331  
         6.212  
Constant -0.146 -0.152 -0.149 -0.159 -0.164 -0.162 -0.159 -0.165 -0.157  
  0.120   0.119   0.119   0.121   0.120   0.120   0.121   0.121   0.121   
                   
no. of observations 2353 2353 2353 2351 2351 2351 2351 2351 2351  
Wald (joint) 85.56 *** 104.6 *** 103.5 *** 90.47 *** 106.1 *** 106.6 *** 103.6 *** 108.3 *** 107.8 *** 
Sargan test (two-step) 137 140.9 139.3 135.8 138 135.7 135.2 131 124.3  
AR(1) test -8.803 *** -8.819 *** -8.825 *** -8.774 *** -8.788 *** -8.793 *** -8.765 *** -8.794 *** -8.791 *** 
AR(2) test 0.5011   0.5278   0.5134   0.5768   0.5866   0.5712   0.5378   0.5823   0.5277   
This table presents the one-step GMM-SYS estimates. The robust standard errors are given under the coefficients.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Research results when the random effects estimator is used 
 
  28   29   30   31   32   33   34   
DEPOSIT_GR 0.104 *** 0.103 *** 0.104 *** 0.103 *** 0.101 *** 0.099 *** 0.100 *** 
 0.019  0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019  0.019
          
INTEREST_EXP 1.565 *** 1.607 *** 1.594 *** 1.612 *** 1.592 *** 1.582 *** 1.583 *** 
 0.455  0.456 0.455 0.456 0.456 0.455  0.455
          
OROA 0.614 ** 0.619 ** 0.614 ** 0.624 ** 0.606 ** 0.591 ** 0.608 ** 
 0.275  0.275  0.275  0.275  0.275  0.275  0.275  
LOANS 0.058  0.060  0.060  0.056  0.061  0.071  0.068  
 0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  
EQUITY 0.465 *** 0.462 *** 0.454 *** 0.459 *** 0.454 *** 0.458 *** 0.458 *** 
 0.085  0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085  0.085
          
CIR -0.053 * -0.049  -0.050  -0.049  -0.050  -0.055 * -0.054 * 
 0.032  0.032  0.032  0.032  0.032  0.032  0.032  
NCI_SHARE -0.040  -0.043  -0.039  -0.044  -0.047  -0.033  -0.037  
 0.065  0.065  0.065  0.065  0.065  0.065  0.065  
RELAT_FIXED_ASSET
S -0.075  -0.075  -0.075  -0.076  -0.081 * -0.080 * -0.079  
 0.048  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.048  
ASSETS -0.153  -0.149  -0.154  -0.144  -0.129  -0.089  -0.101  
 0.222  0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222  0.223
GOV -0.007  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008  -0.007
 0.023  0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023  0.023
FGN 0.006  0.011 0.017 0.012 0.012 0.015  0.014
 0.025  0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025  0.025
           
PAR_EQUITY 0.838  0.865  0.900  0.845  0.969  0.935  0.913  
 0.626  0.627  0.626  0.626  0.629  0.626  0.627  
PAR_LOANS 0.016  0.022  0.017  0.025  0.020  0.018  0.017  
 0.063  0.063  0.062  0.063  0.063  0.062  0.063  
PAR_ROA -0.568  -0.818  -1.399  -1.122  -1.052  -0.843  -0.780  
 1.779  1.785 1.791 1.786 1.790 1.778  1.779
           
PAR_NEG_COV         -0.198 **     
         0.084      
PAR_NEG_COV_50           -0.110 ***   
           0.032    
PAR_NUM_NEG_50             -0.089 *** 
             0.032  
          
PAR_HELP1   -0.056 *           
   0.031            
PAR_HELP2     -0.157 ***         
     0.044          
PAR_HELP3       -0.142 ***       
     0.045     
          
Constant -0.059  -0.064 -0.063 -0.062 -0.061 -0.064  -0.064
  0.109   0.109   0.108   0.108   0.109   0.108   0.109   
          
no. of observations 2351  2351 2351 2351 2351 2351  2351
Wald (joint) 171.5 *** 173.9 *** 184.3 *** 180.7 *** 176.4 *** 183 *** 178.6 ***
R2 0.285   0.286   0.289   0.288   0.286   0.288   0.287   
This table presents the random effects estimates. The robust standard errors are given under the coefficients.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Table 9. Research results when the risk of parent companies and banks is described by contemporaneous variables 
 
 35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   
DDEPOSIT_GR 0.025  0.024  0.024  0.023  0.024  0.025  0.026  0.027  
0.025  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.025  0.025  
                
DINTEREST_EXP 2.471 ** 2.277 * 2.281 ** 2.271 ** 2.282 ** 2.288 ** 2.299 ** 2.320 ** 
1.169  1.168  1.159  1.159  1.163  1.163  1.155  1.158  
                
DOROAC 1.551  2.330 ** 2.455 ** 2.500 ** 2.501 ** 2.444 ** 2.450 ** 2.444 ** 
1.080  1.190  1.192  1.195  1.199  1.200  1.192  1.194  
DLOANSC -0.291 ** -0.272 * -0.291 ** -0.288 ** -0.291 ** -0.292 ** -0.300 ** -0.299 ** 
0.142  0.144  0.143  0.144  0.145  0.144  0.143  0.143  
DEQUITYC -0.596 * -0.711 ** -0.734 ** -0.725 ** -0.726 ** -0.730 ** -0.720 ** -0.729 ** 
0.327  0.323  0.323  0.323  0.323  0.323  0.320  0.323  
DOROA_X_CRISISC 1.387                
1.374                
DLOANS_X_CRISISC 0.182                
0.164                
DEQUITY_X_CRISISC -0.018                
0.499                
                
DCIR -0.070  -0.052  -0.048  -0.048  -0.047  -0.046  -0.041  -0.044  
0.089  0.095  0.096  0.094  0.094  0.097  0.095  0.095  
DNCI_SHARE 0.002  0.050  0.049  0.063  0.062  0.052  0.056  0.057  
0.169  0.182  0.181  0.180  0.179  0.181  0.179  0.180  
DRELAT_FIXED_ASSETS -0.253 *** -0.292 *** -0.289 *** -0.287 *** -0.286 *** -0.281 *** -0.283 *** -0.285 *** 
0.058  0.060  0.060  0.061  0.061  0.060  0.062  0.062  
DASSETS 0.738 ** 0.936 *** 0.899 *** 0.941 *** 0.926 *** 0.857 *** 0.882 *** 0.893 *** 
0.321  0.330  0.329  0.334  0.333  0.329  0.338  0.340  
DGOV -0.028  -0.026  -0.021  -0.022  -0.022  -0.022  -0.021  -0.021  
0.031  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  
DFGN 0.046 * 0.014  0.015  0.019  0.018  0.010  0.019  0.015  
0.026  0.039  0.039  0.039  0.038  0.039  0.039  0.039  
                
DPAR_EQUITYC   -0.755  0.376  0.378  0.327  0.187  0.532  0.567  
  0.945  0.694  0.693  0.697  0.687  0.702  0.699  
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DPAR_LOANSC   0.103  0.061  0.060  0.061  0.069  0.048  0.053  
  0.105  0.099  0.098  0.099  0.099  0.098  0.098  
DPAR_ROAC   2.147  0.206  0.176  0.333  0.721  -0.906  -1.056  
  2.107  1.606  1.637  1.639  1.603  1.765  1.764  
DPAR_EQUITY_X_CRISISC   2.283 *             
  1.281              
DPAR_LOANS_X_CRISISC   -0.151              
  0.132              
DPAR_ROA_X_CRISISC   -0.603              
  3.576              
                
DPAR_NEG_COV     -0.204 ***          
    0.077            
DPAR_NEG_COV_50       -0.106 **         
      0.042          
DPAR_NUM_NEG_50         -0.083 **       
        0.041        
DPAR_HELP1           -0.012      
          0.037      
DPAR_HELP2             -0.151 ***  
            0.045    
DPAR_HELP3               -0.155 *** 
              0.042  
                
Constant 0.258  0.192  0.175  0.163  0.164  0.175  0.168  0.173  
 0.166   0.175   0.174   0.175   0.175   0.177   0.174   0.174   
                 
no. of observations 2351  2349  2349  2349  2349  2349  2349  2349  
Wald (joint) 59.98 *** 74.18 *** 64.18 *** 67.98 *** 67.41 *** 58.23 *** 65.76 *** 66.51 *** 
Sargan test (two-step) 140.7  132.8  132.2  135.2  135.1  137.4  138.8  138.4  
AR(1) test -9.01 *** -8.93 *** -8.888 *** -8.881 *** -8.876 *** -8.903 *** -8.907 *** -8.915 *** 
AR(2) test 0.4805   0.4082   0.4382   0.3988   0.3963   0.4051   0.4446   0.429   
C identifies the contemporaneous variables used instead of the lagged variables.  
This table presents the one-step GMM-SYS estimates. The robust standard errors are given under the coefficients.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 10. Research results and modifications in safety net arrangements 
 
  43   44   45   46   47   48   49   
DDEPOSIT_GR 0,018  0,018  0,018  0,012  0,016  0,012  0,016  
 0,024  0,025  0,025  0,023  0,023  0,025  0,024  
               
DINTEREST_EXP 1,202  1,493  1,423  1,348  1,389  1,512  1,565  
 1,167  1,177  1,177  1,154  1,155  1,191  1,193  
               
DOROA 0,965  1,059  1,054  1,059  1,060  0,980  0,948  
 0,724  0,672  0,670  0,690  0,691  0,775  0,773  
DLOANS 0,232 * 0,322 ** 0,324 ** 0,271 ** 0,262 ** 0,263 ** 0,256 ** 
 0,124  0,127  0,128  0,127  0,127  0,126  0,125  
DEQUITY 0,935 *** 0,958 *** 0,948 *** 0,967 *** 0,955 *** 0,897 
**
* 0,889 *** 
 0,242  0,245  0,248  0,243  0,243  0,247  0,249  
DOROA_X_CRISIS -0,295              
 1,302              
DLOANS _X_CRISIS 0,069              
 0,201              
DEQUITY_X_CRISIS -0,149              
 0,390              
               
DCIR -0,213 *** -0,185 ** -0,184 ** -0,209 *** -0,204 *** -0,156 ** -0,150 ** 
 0,065  0,073  0,073  0,067  0,067  0,069  0,070  
DNCI_SHARE 0,230  0,234  0,234  0,183  0,175  0,133  0,124  
 0,177  0,188  0,187  0,179  0,179  0,198  0,198  
DRELAT_FIXED_ASSETS -0,179 *** -0,175 *** -0,172 *** -0,196 *** -0,193 *** -0,183 
**
* -0,179 *** 
 0,060  0,061  0,062  0,063  0,063  0,060  0,060  
DASSETS 0,651 * 0,682 * 0,662 * 0,876 ** 0,804 ** 0,807 ** 0,727 ** 
 0,376  0,368  0,373  0,395  0,391  0,377  0,371  
               
DGOV -0,032  -0,032  -0,031  -0,035  -0,033  -0,034  -0,032  
 0,032  0,034  0,034  0,033  0,033  0,032  0,032  
DFGN 0,030  0,031  0,032  0,022  0,016  0,014  0,011  
 0,024  0,028  0,028  0,032  0,032  0,034  0,034  
DGOV_X_CRISIS   -0,057  0,039          
   0,085  0,069          
DFGN_X_CRISIS   -0,023  0,046          
   0,049  0,169          
               
DPAR_EQUITY       1,220  1,100  1,400  1,254  
       0,935  0,923  0,934  0,922  
DPAR_LOANS       -0,063  -0,058  -0,055  -0,050  
       0,090  0,089  0,090  0,089  
DPAR_ROA       -0,613  -0,878  -1,020  -1,362  
       3,143  3,283  3,108  3,322  
               
DLOANS_X_LOWCOVMULTP 0,406      0,456 * 0,453 *     
 0,303      0,263  0,269      
DEQUITY_X_LOWCOVMULT
P 1,922 **     1,488 * 1,530 *     
 0,945      0,862  0,925      
DOROA_X_LOVCOWMULTP 0,093      -0,204  0,074      
 3,792      3,700  3,715      
DLOANS_X_NONFULLGUAR           0,196  0,136  
           0,186  0,185  
 48
DEQUITY_X_NONFULLGUAR           -0,009  0,027  
           0,394  0,384  
DOROA_X_NONFULLGUAR           -0,019  0,405  
           1,428  1,480  
DGOV_X_LOWCOVMULTP   0,295 **           
   0,130            
DFGN_X_LOWCOVMULTP   0,136            
   0,110            
DGOV_X_NONFULLGUAR     -0,027          
     0,076          
DFGN_X_NONFULLGUAR     -0,052          
     0,174          
               
DPAR_NEG_COV_50       -0,128 ***   -0,143 
**
*   
       0,042    0,038    
DPAR_NUM_NEG_50               
               
DPAR_HELP2             -0,133 *** 
             0,042  
DPAR_HELP3         -0,115 ***     
         0,043      
               
Constant -0,081  -0,143  -0,143  -0,109  -0,102  -0,120  -0,113  
  0,119   0,121   0,121   0,117   0,117   0,123   0,122   
               
no. of observations 2353  2353  2353  2351  2351  2351  2351  
Wald (joint) 101,6 *** 88 *** 85,08 *** 107,5 *** 111,3 *** 107 
**
* 110,7 *** 
Sargan test (two-step) 138,1  131,4  129,9  133,5  133,3  132,5  134,7  
AR(1) test -8,893 *** -8,782 *** -8,808 *** -8,795 *** -8,857 *** -8,778 
**
* -8,828 *** 
AR(2) test 0,4687   0,507   0,5072   0,5729   0,5515   0,6257   0,6068   
This table presents the one-step GMM-SYS estimates. The robust standard errors are given under the 
coefficients.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 11. Research results and too big to fail status of some parent companies 
 
  50   51   52   53   54   55   
DDEPOSIT_GR 0.012  0.011  0.013  0.012  0.012  0.013  
 0.024  0.024  0.025  0.024  0.024  0.024  
             
DINTEREST_EXP 1.479  1.462  1.472  1.464  1.469  1.468  
 1.171  1.172  1.175  1.167  1.170  1.170  
             
DOROA 1.184 * 1.183 * 1.190 * 1.234 * 1.226 * 1.229 * 
 0.686  0.687  0.684  0.685  0.687  0.684  
DLOANS 0.314 ** 0.314 ** 0.315 ** 0.310 ** 0.310 ** 0.310 ** 
 0.128  0.128  0.128  0.130  0.129  0.129  
DEQUITY 0.962 *** 0.971 *** 0.967 *** 0.950 *** 0.960 *** 0.954 *** 
 0.246  0.247  0.246  0.246  0.247  0.246  
             
DCIR -0.177 ** -0.176 ** -0.176 ** -0.172 ** -0.172 ** -0.172 ** 
 0.073  0.072  0.072  0.074  0.073  0.073  
DNCI_SHARE 0.181  0.192  0.192  0.187  0.198  0.199  
 0.191  0.190  0.190  0.191  0.190  0.190  
DRELAT_FIXED_ASSETS -0.194 *** -0.186 *** -0.188 *** -0.208 *** -0.199 *** -0.201 *** 
 0.062  0.062  0.062  0.065  0.064  0.064  
DASSETS 0.945 ** 0.931 ** 0.935 ** 1.008 ** 0.980 ** 0.990 ** 
 0.387  0.388  0.387  0.396  0.392  0.393  
             
DGOV -0.032  -0.033  -0.033  -0.032  -0.033  -0.033  
 0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  
DFGN 0.027  0.030  0.029  0.024  0.026  0.025  
 0.034  0.034  0.034  0.033  0.033  0.033  
             
DPAR_EQUITY 1.230  1.253  1.236  1.109  1.182  1.138  
 0.945  0.950  0.948  0.934  0.948  0.943  
DPAR_LOANS -0.022  -0.027  -0.029  -0.024  -0.029  -0.030  
 0.092  0.092  0.093  0.092  0.092  0.092  
DPAR_ROA -0.570  -0.635  -0.526  -0.595  -0.653  -0.534  
 3.087  3.126  3.096  3.169  3.187  3.162  
             
DPAR_NEG_COV -0.197 ***     -0.182 **     
 0.076      0.077      
DPAR_NEG_COV_50   -0.125 ***     -0.114 **   
   0.044      0.046    
DPAR_NUM_NEG_50     -0.094 **     -0.082 * 
    0.044       0.046  
             
DPAR_TBTF -0.058 ** -0.060 ** -0.058 **       
 0.024  0.024  0.024        
DPAR_TBTFa       -0.092 *** -0.092 *** -0.092 *** 
       0.029  0.029  0.029  
DPAR_TBTF_X_CRISIS -0.041  0.002  -0.014        
 0.038  0.039  0.042        
DPAR_TBTFa_X_CRISIS       -0.024  0.023  0.004  
       0.043  0.044  0.048  
             
 50
Constant -0.158  -0.164  -0.163  -0.167  -0.172  -0.171  
  0.120   0.120   0.120   0.119   0.118   0.118   
              
no. of observations 2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  
Wald (joint) 102 *** 105.6 *** 102 *** 103.8 *** 106.4 *** 102.6 *** 
Sargan test (two-step) 126.6  130.9  130  130.1  132  129.9  
AR(1) test -8.762 *** -8.753 *** -8.745 *** -8.759 *** -8.745 *** -8.744 *** 
AR(2) test 0.5892   0.5935   0.575   0.5685   0.5692   0.5531   
This table presents the one-step GMM-SYS estimates. The robust standard errors are given under the 
coefficients.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
